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1 Introduction
Inventory management is a key issue for many firms, be they large or small: well-
known management theories emphasize the need to stay lean, the gain to proceed
with just-in-time deliveries and zero inventories, or on the contrary the possibility
to benefit from economies of scale by purchasing or producing the economic-order-
quantity (Arrow, Harris and Marschak [1951], Zipkin [2000]), and hence storing. The
importance of inventories in economic analysis has also been recognized. For instance
Arvan and Moses [1982] show that economies of scale in the production of a storable
good lead a monopolist to adjust its output in the long run. Social losses then differ
compared to the static case. Blanchard [1983] investigates the behaviour of finished
good inventories in the U.S. automobile industry1. Descriptive statistics show that
”production smoothing is not the dominant element of inventory behavior and that
target inventory is probably a function of current sales” (p.374, our emphasis), and
econometric estimations confirm this finding. Using a sample of U.S. firms from the
good-producing manufacturing industries, Amihud and Mendelson [1989] show that
firms hold larger level of inventories the greater their market power. However an
interesting theoretical question is to understand how a target level of inventories is
determined when firms are part of an oligopoly, as for example the U.S. automobile
industry, and more broadly to investigate how inventory levels vary with the degree
of competition. Is it possible to revert the causal relationship and find that larger
equilibrium level of inventories allow firms to enjoy larger equilibrium market shares
and consequently greater market power on an oligopolistic market? Moreover how is
the equilibrium level of inventories affected by changes in the degree of competition?
Answering these questions is the object of this study.
Under constant returns-to-scale and in the absence of any capacity constraint
or uncertainty, we show that Cournot oligopolistic competition in which n firms
produce to store in a first period, before producing again and selling on the market
in second period, has a Nash-perfect equilibrium in pure strategy no matter the
number of firms in competition or the cost of storage. Equilibria can be multiple
and differ according to the number of firms which store. The static Cournot-Nash
1Blanchard uses monthly data from January 1966 to December 1979 for 10 divisions of the main
U.S. manufacturers: 5 from GM, 2 from Ford, 2 from Chrysler and 1 from American Motors.
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outcome where no firm stores is the expected unique equilibrium of the game when
the cost of storage is large enough, but outside this range it is not an equilibrium
anymore. For intermediate or small values of the cost of storage, equilibria are such
that a subset of firms is storing a positive quantity to exert endogenously some
Stackelberg leadership over the rest of firms who behave as followers, who do not
store and who produce and sell in second period only. The number of firms storing at
equilibrium results from the trade-off between a larger market share, gained thanks
to the endogenous commitment to be more aggressive on the market by accumulating
early the output, and a smaller margin, due to the increase in competition among
firms and to the increase in the costs of operations that include now a cost of storage.
The profitability of the strategy that consists in increasing inventories to credibly
commit to gain market shares is therefore larger when a few firms are in competition
on the market, and decreases when n increases, which suggests a non monotonicity
of the equilibrium in the number of competitors. We confirm this intuition and show
that the number of firms storing and the aggregate inventories at equilibrium can
be non monotonic with the number of firms in competition. Finally as the equilibria
are asymmetric,- except of course the Cournot one when it occurs -, concentration
increases compared to what it would be at the static Cournot-Nash equilibrium, with
identical demand and costs. We show that the Herfindhal-Hirschman concentration
index (HHI) is strictly larger than the value it obtains in static Cournot competition,
while the price-cost margin is strictly lower due to the increase in competition caused
by inventories.
We illustrate these findings and study the effect of an entry of competitors on the
set of equilibria with an example. The number of firms storing and the aggregate
inventories are non monotonic with respect to the number of firms in competition.
As predicted, the HHI and the aggregate sales both reach levels strictly larger than
what they do in static Cournot competition when storing to gain market shares
is a profitable strategy: the market is more concentrated and more competitive
than what it would be if storage were impossible. Together with our theoretical
findings, these results suggest that observing a mass of firms storing is more likely
on oligopolistic markets than on market structures closer to the duopoly or to perfect
competition. Moreover they also suggest that the HHI cannot be used as the sole
measure of competitiveness on markets where the finished product is storable and
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storage is used to exert some market share leadership.
The commitment value of inventories in two-period Cournot duopolistic compe-
tition has been recognized in the literature since the path-breaking articles of Arvan
[1985] and Ware [1985]. Both articles identify that once the costs of production
have been sunk, inventories endow firms with a capacity from which they can sell
while suffering no marginal cost of production. This creates an endogenous discon-
tinuity in the marginal cost the firm is facing when deciding how much to produce
and sell on the market, which may result in a first mover advantage. This effect,
obviously linked to Dixit [1980], implies the existence of asymmetric equilibria even
if firms are identical with respect to their production technology, and produce and
sell simultaneously in every period2. In an independent series of papers, Saloner
[1987] and Pal ([1991], [1996]) study duopolistic Cournot competition with advance
production and constant returns-to-scale, to show that multiple equilibria may arise,
but that this multiplicity may disappear with cost variations3. We generalize these
results to the case of an oligopoly and we study the effect of entry. The resolution
of this game is made by constructing the backward reaction mapping proposed by
Novshek [1984] (see also Bamon and Fraysse´ [1985]), that is by constructing the best
reply of each firm to the aggregate sales of the industry compatible with this firm
optimization program. Due to the use of inventories, backward reaction mappings
turn out to be different across firms even if firms are ex-ante identical, but for each
distribution of inventories these backward reaction mappings determine a unique
and possibly asymmetric Nash equilibrium in pure strategy to the second period
Cournot sub-game.
Our results are closely connected to the broader and more recent literature study-
ing the industrial organization of commodity markets4 and the strategic role of for-
ward markets. In their seminal article, Allaz and Vila [1993] show that forward
markets may be used by Cournot duopolists to compete for the Stackelberg leader-
ship. The equilibrium of the game is however symmetric, firms competing in advance
2See Ware [1984] for a different version of the game in Dixit [1980].
3Romano and Yildirim (2005) partly generalize the result of Saloner to the broader class of
duopolistic games of capital accumulation. Contrary to Saloner they focus on games in which the
Stackelberg equilibrium in unique.
4See Anderson [1984] for earlier contributions.
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for a larger share of the market5. Our paper differs from these studies in the type of
commitment considered: while forward sales can be re-interpreted as a commitment
which places the entire industry in front of a reduced residual demand when forward
contracts are exerted, inventories are committing only the firm which is holding
them, source of the asymmetry of the Nash equilibrium. The use of inventories and
forward trading in imperfect competition has also been studied in the context of
longer dynamic with uncertain demand and costs (see Kirman and Sobel [1974] and
Thille ([2003], [2006])).
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the model;
section 3 shows that for any distribution of ordered inventories across firms, it exists
a unique sub-game equilibrium in which market shares can be asymmetric. Then
section 4 derives the equilibria of the game and study the effect of entry. Section 5
summarizes our results and concludes.
2 The Model
We consider an homogenous market with n Cournot competitors indexed by i, i ∈
I = {1, ..., n}, n ≥ 2, competing over two periods indexed by t = 1, 2. Let qit be
the production level of firm i in period t, qt = (q
1
t , ..., q
n
t ) the production vector in
period t, Qt =
∑
i q
i
t the aggregate output and Q
−i
t =
∑
j 6=i q
j
t the aggregate output
of firms j 6= i.
Production may be undertaken in any period, but the market opens in period
2 only. Let si be the quantity sold by firm i in period 2. Individual sales cannot
be larger than the total output available in period 2, si ≤ qi1 + qi2. Finally we
denote s = (s1, ..., sn) the sales vector, S =
∑
i s
i the aggregate sales level and
S−i =
∑
j 6=i s
j the aggregate sales of firm j 6= i.
Firms have access to the same constant returns production technology and the
same factor prices. Each one is a ”small” buyer in the factor market, taking prices as
given. Hence all firms have the same constant marginal cost of production denoted
by c, c > 0.
We assume that pure inventory costs are nil, excepted the opportunity cost of
5See Thille and Slade [2000], Mahenc and Salanie´ [2004], and Liski and Montero [2006] for
different specifications which modify Allaz and Vila’s result.
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working capital. Assuming that the capital market is perfectly competitive, and
denoting by ρ the interest rate, the only opportunity cost is the cost of producing in
period 1 rather than in period 2, that is ρ c qi1 in terms of value in period 2. Under
a free disposal assumption insuring that inventories unsold at the end of period 2
can be disposed off at zero cost, the total cost of any production and sale plan is
given by (C.1), in period 2 value:
Assumption (C.1) For any firm i ∈ I and any plan {(qi1, qi2, si) : si ≤ qi1 + qi2}, the
total cost incurred in second period, Ci2(q
i
1, q
i
2, s
i), is given by:
Ci2(q
i
1, q
i
2, s
i) = (1 + ρ) c qi1 + c q
i
2.
Introducing an interest rate allows us to introduce cost differentials between periods
that help to select the number of equilibria6; we discuss more broadly this issue after
having stated our main results in section 4.
The market demand function is assumed to be linear. This insures that the
Stackelberg equilibrium is unique, a useful but not crucial property of the payoff
functions7. Without loss of generality we assume that its slope is equal to −1. Thus:
Assumption (D.1) Let P (S) be the inverse demand function, then
P (S) = max{a− S, 0}, a > 0.
For the ease of the analysis most of the discussion is lead under the following
assumption:
Assumption (A.1) The intercept of the inverse demand a and the marginal cost of
production c satisfy
c ≤ a ≤ 3 c.
6This relates to Pal (1991)’s extension of the work of Saloner (1987).
7Neither Arvan (1985) nor Saloner (1987) results for a duopoly rely on this assumption. As-
suming a concave inverse demand to work under a more general quasi-concavity assumption on
the payoff function as in Romano and Yildirim (2005) would be a costly alternative in terms of
mathematical content. We chose to assume quadratic payoffs to state our results in the simplest
form possible.
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We discuss the importance of this assumption in section 4; it basically guarantees
that the textbook Stackelberg equilibrium is a feasible outcome of our game. If it
is relaxed the asymmetric equilibrium still exists in pure strategies but the leader
output is slightly smaller than the textbook Stackelberg output. This feature does
not occur in capital accumulation games8 as players cannot reduce their commit-
ment, while on the contrary in our game players are allowed to sell less than their
inventories. Moreover we adopt the convention that if firms inventories differ, then
firm 1 is the one with the highest level of inventories, firm 2 is the one with the
second highest level of inventories, ..., and so on.
Convention: Firms are indexed by decreasing order of period 1 production levels,
q11 ≥ q21 ≥ ... ≥ qn−11 ≥ qn1 .
We assume that any firm can observe all the period 1 production levels but
cannot observe period 2 production and sale levels of its competitors. We discuss
this assumption after having presented firms payoffs at the end of this section. Under
this assumption the strategy of firm i, denoted by σi, is a 3-tuple:
σi = {qi1, q˜i2, s˜i} (1)
where:
qi1 ∈ R+, q˜i2 : Rn+ → R+, s˜i : Rn+1+ → R+ (2)
with s˜i satisfying the following condition:
∀ (q1, qi2) ∈ Rn+1+ , s˜i(q1, qi2) ≤ qi1 + qi2. (3)
To any n-tuple of strategy σ, σ = {σ1, ..., σi, ..., σn}, corresponds a payoff function
πi for firm i given by, in period 2 value:
πi(σi, σ−i) = P
(∑
j 6=i
s˜j(q1, q˜
j
2) + s˜
i(q1, q˜
i
2)
)
s˜i(q1, q˜
i
2)− Ci2(qi1, q˜i2, s˜i(q1, q˜i2)). (4)
We are searching for the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of
this game. The possibility of finding mixed strategy Nash equilibria is discussed in
8See Saloner (1987) or Romano and Yildirim (2005).
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section 4 (see Pal (1996)).
Before analyzing our game, let us discuss the impact of the non-observability of
first period actions on our results. Doing a parallel with the way non-observability
modifies the impact of an exogenous commitment9, we conjecture that the non-
observability of inventories would not jeopardize our results provided that we in-
troduce a communication technology precise enough. As Schelling (1960) pointed
out, the player which has a commitment must make sure the other players know
this commitment: it needs a communication technology precise enough. In our pa-
per signals could for example be randomly drawn on inventory levels higher when
inventories are large than when they are small. This assumption seems realistic in
practice: for example industry reports, mid-year financial statements, or sales em-
ployees bargaining with customers may be seen as signals observed by competitors
from which posterior beliefs can be derived. We leave the study of this possibility
for another paper.
3 Sub-game equilibria
We describe now the sub-game equilibria for each vector of inventories chosen in
period 1, q1: proposition 1 presents the aggregate oligopolistic sales at the Nash
equilibrium of each sub-game. To each aggregate sales corresponds a unique vector
of equilibrium individual sales. As expected, individual and aggregate sales in equi-
librium depend on the level of inventories produced by firms in period 1, and differ
depending on how large individual inventories are. The conditions on inventories
characterizing each sub-game can be expressed as differences between the marginal
revenues obtained by firms when selling their inventories and the effective marginal
costs of production. The formal proof of these results is given in appendix A. We
now explain the main steps leading to proposition 1.
The effective marginal cost of production of Cournot oligopolists storing their
finished product is linked to, but differ from, the marginal cost of production c as
follows. As the cost of production of inventories is sunk when selling on the market
in second period, inventories can be thought of as an exhaustible capacity from
9See Bagwell [1991], Van Damme and Hurkens [1997] and Maggi [1998].
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which firms can sell without producing as long as the quantity currently sold is
smaller than the quantity previously stored. The marginal cost of supplying a unit
from inventories is therefore equal to 0, as long as inventories are not exhausted.
As soon as its sales exceed its inventories, a firm must produce again and suffers
a positive marginal cost of production. Consequently bringing inventories of the
finished product from one period to another modifies the economic behaviour of
a firm by modifying its second period competitive supply. Although this effect of
inventories has already been explained10, and obviously relates to Dixit [1980], it is
useful to present it differently from older studies by introducing formally the effective
marginal cost of production of each firm, γi(si, qi1), given by
γi(si, qi1) =
 0 if si ≤ qi1c if si > qi1. (5)
Even if technologies are ex-ante identical, effective marginal costs differ across firms
once inventories have been produced, and present a firm-specific jump at si = qi1.
The set of economically feasible sales at a given market price is therefore larger when
firms store their output than when they do not: firms are now ready to sell up to
their inventories qi1 if the market price p goes below their marginal cost of production
c. Consequently, by storing a quantity qi1 large enough, a Cournot competitor may
resist to an increase in its opponent sales by still preferring to release its inventories
qi1 on the market rather than reducing its sales. This effect of inventories can be
derived by confronting γi(si, qi1) to the marginal revenue m
i(si, S−i),
mi(si, S−i) = a− 2 si − S−i, (6)
to obtain the best response of a firm to an increase in sales of its competitors. Given
the form of the effective marginal cost of production γi, the individual best reply
shows the three different types of behaviour of firm i, depending on competitors
sales S−i and on initial inventories qi1. If given q
i
1, competitors sales S
−i are such
that the marginal revenue to sell qi1, m
i(qi1, S
−i), exceeds the marginal cost c, then
firm i produces again in second period and sells more than qi1. If m
i(qi1, S
−i) is
lower than the marginal cost c but positive, then firm i sells exactly its inventories.
Finally if mi(qi1, S
−i) is strictly negative, then firm i is better off selling less than its
10See Arvan [1985] and Ware [1985]
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inventories. Individual best responses are given by
ŝi(S−i, qi1) =

1
2
(a− c− S−i) if S−i ≤ a− c− 2qi1
qi1 if S
−i ∈ [a− c− 2qi1, a− 2qi1]
1
2
(a− S−i) if a− 2qi1 ≤ S−i
(7)
Inventories therefore create firm-specific kinks in firms best replies, the firm best
reply becomes locally inelastic to an increase in its competitors sales, and finally for
any given level of sales of its competitors, the level of output a firm sells is higher
when it owns inventories than when it does not. This is the source of the asymmetry
of the Nash equilibrium in our game.
To find all the equilibria of the game, we start to define the aggregate sales
S compatible with the maximisation program of an individual firm i, by adding
S−i to the best response ŝi(S−i, qi1). We denote this function S
•
i (S
−i, qi1), and we
invert it to find aggregate sales of the competitors of firm i compatible with firm i
maximisation program; we denote S−i(S, qi1) this function. Finally, we deduce the
individual sales of firm i which best respond to aggregate sales S and which are
compatible with firm i’s optimization, by solving S− si = S−i(S, qi1) with respect to
si. This last operation gives us the backward reaction mapping si(S, qi1). We then
aggregate all the backward reaction mappings, and we determine the fixed points
of Sˆ(S, qi1) =
∑n
i=1 s
i(S, qi1). We draw the reader’s attention on the fact that we
describe the second period sub-game equilibria focusing on level of inventories lower
than the quantity qm a monopoly minimizing its cost of production would produce,
where qm = (a − c)/2. Indeed, due to the presence of the interest rate ρ and of
n − 1 competitors, no firm stores more than the quantity a monopoly producing
in second period would sell, and all the sub-games that follow inventory choices
larger than qm for all firms are trivially dominated. This restriction turns out to be
useful when aggregating the individual best replies to derive the aggregate sales at
the Nash equilibrium. To each fixed point of Sˆ(S, qi1) corresponds a unique n-tuple
of equilibrium individual sales, and the conditions on inventories vectors leading
to each of the equilibrium sales appear to be linked to conditions on the marginal
revenues and on the marginal costs, as we now discuss.
Let us give an example of conditions on inventories leading to a particular Nash
equilibrium in the sales sub-game. To be in a sub-game equilibrium in which firms
1, 2, ..., k sell exactly their inventories, and firms k + 1, ..., n sell strictly more than
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their inventories, it suffices that given equilibrium sales of competitors,
(1) the marginal revenue of firm k+1 when selling qk+11 is strictly higher than the
marginal cost c (so will it be for firms k+ 2, ..., n who own inventories smaller
than firm k + 1),
(2) the marginal revenue of firm k when selling qk1 is strictly lower than c (so will
it be for firms 1, ..., k − 1 who own inventories larger than firm k) and
(3) the marginal revenue of firm 1 when selling q11 is strictly positive (and so will
it be for firms 2, ..., k).
Indeed, when only firms i = 1, ..., k sell exactly their inventories, then in equi-
librium firms k+ 1, ..., n sell the same quantity higher than their inventories. Firms
k + 1, ..., n are therefore confronted to the same equilibrium sales of competitors
(equal to the sum of inventories of firms 1, ..., k plus (n − 1) times the quantity
sold by any of the firms k + 1, ..., n). Consequently the marginal revenues of firms
k + 1, ..., n are identical functions of individual sales s. Due to the fact that the
marginal revenue is decreasing in individual sales s, then if firm k + 1 (with the
highest level of inventories qk+11 in the group of firms {k+1, ..., n} selling more than
their inventories) faces a marginal revenue higher than the effective marginal cost
at s = qk+11 , then the same is true for all the other firms of this group, explaining
condition (1).
On the contrary, the marginal revenues of firms 1, ..., k (who sell exactly their
inventories) evaluated at the equilibrium sales of their competitors jump upward
the higher the level of firm inventories. Indeed firm i is confronted to aggregate
sales in equilibrium equal to the sum of inventories of firms 1, ..., i − 1, i + 1, ...k,
plus the identical sales of firms k + 1, ..., n. This quantity is lower the higher the
level of inventories of firm i, since the aggregate level of inventories of competitors
selling these inventories is mechanically lower. The value of the marginal revenue at
si = qi1 is however lower the higher the level of inventories of the firm we consider, by
definition of the marginal revenue11, which explains why focusing on the comparison
between the marginal revenue of firm k when selling qk1 and the marginal cost c is
sufficient (condition (2)).
11One replaces −qi1 by −2qi1 in each expression.
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Finally under assumption (A.1), and restricting our attention to q11 ≤ (a− c)/2,
condition (3) is verified as long as we consider k < n. However when we characterize
the sub-game equilibrium in which all firms are selling exactly their inventories, i.e.
such that the marginal revenue of firm n is lower than c when it sells exactly qn1 ,
then condition (3) needs to be verified. If (3) is verified, then the marginal revenues
of firms 1, ..., n − 1 are also positive, leading to the sub-game equilibrium we are
searching for.
The same analysis can be done to characterize all the sub-game equilibria, in
particular those in which some firms are selling exactly their inventories and some
others less than their inventories. To present all the sub-game equilibria, we intro-
duce the following set of notations. The sequence of sets {B(ℓ)}ℓ=0,...,2n characterizes
for each ℓ the values of inventories leading to a sales sub-game in which some firms
are selling more than, some firms are selling exactly, and some firms are selling less
than their inventories. We define this sequence as follows:
• B(0) = {q1 | m1 (q11, (n− 1)(a− c)/(n+ 1)) ≥ c} denotes the set of invento-
ries such that all firms are selling in second period strictly more than their
inventories,
• For ℓ ∈ {1, ..., n−1}, B(ℓ) denotes the set of inventories such that firms 1, ..., ℓ
are selling exactly their inventories and firms ℓ + 1, ..., n are selling strictly
more. It is defined as
B(ℓ) = {q1 | mℓ
(
qℓ1, (n− ℓ)(a− c−
∑ℓ
i=1 q
i
1)/(n− ℓ+ 1) +
∑ℓ−1
i=1 q
i
1
)
< c,
mℓ+1
(
qℓ+11 , (n− ℓ− 1)(a− c−
∑ℓ
i=1 q
i
1)/(n− ℓ+ 1) +
∑ℓ
i=1 q
i
1
)
≥ c},
• B(n) = {q1 | mn
(
qn1 ,
∑n−1
i=1 q
i
1
)
< c,m1 (q11 ,
∑n
i=2 q
i
1) ≥ 0} denotes the set of
inventories such that all firms are selling exactly their inventories,
• For ℓ ∈ {n+ 1, ..., 2n− 1}, B(ℓ) denotes the set of inventories such that firms
1, ..., ℓ− n sell less than their inventories and firms ℓ− n+ 1, ..., n sell exactly
their inventories. It is defined as
B(ℓ) = {q1 | mℓ−n
(
qℓ−n1 , (ℓ− n− 1)(a−
∑n
i=ℓ−n+1 q
i
1)/(ℓ− n + 1) +
∑n
i=ℓ−n+1 q
i
1
)
< 0,
mℓ−n+1
(
qℓ−n+11 , (ℓ− n)(a−
∑n
i=ℓ−n+1 q
i
1)/(ℓ− n+ 1) +
∑n
i=ℓ−n+2 q
i
1
) ≥ 0},
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• Finally B(2n) = {q1 | mn(qn1 , (n− 1)a/(n + 1)) < 0} denotes the set of inven-
tories such that all firms sell less than their inventories.
As its proof shows (available in appendix A.), this set of notations is sufficient
to establish the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Under assumption (A.1) restricting the attention to inventories lower
than the quantity a monopoly minimizing its costs would produce, q11 ≤ (a − c)/2,
aggregate sales S∗ at the Nash equilibrium are given by:
1. if q1 ∈ B(0), then all firms sell more than their inventories, and S∗(0) = n(a−c)n+1 ,
2. if q1 ∈ B(ℓ) for ℓ ∈ {1, ..., n−1}, then firms 1 to ℓ sell exactly their inventories
and
S∗(ℓ) =
(n− ℓ)(a− c) +∑ℓi=1 qi1
n− ℓ+ 1 ,
3. if q1 ∈ B(n) then all firms sell exactly their inventories and S∗(n) =
∑n
i=1 q
i
1,
4. if q1 ∈ B(ℓ) for ℓ ∈ {n+1, ..., 2n−1}, then firms 1 to ℓ−n sell less than their
inventories and
S∗(ℓ) =
(ℓ− n)a+∑ni=ℓ−n+1 qi1
ℓ− n+ 1 ,
5. if q1 ∈ B(2n) then all firms sell less than their inventories and S∗(2n) = n an+1 .
As for a given level of industry sales there is a unique corresponding level of
individual sales, there is a unique vector of individual sales in equilibrium. Individual
sales in equilibrium are given in the corollary at the end of the proof of proposition
1 in appendix A. We turn now to the analysis of the equilibrium of the game.
4 Inventories in equilibrium and effect of entry
To start with, we state what cannot be an equilibrium of our game, to determine on
which of the regions {B(ℓ)}ℓ=0,...,2n we can focus the search for a Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies, if it exists. The lemma below shows first that firms cannot store
in equilibrium more than what they sell in second period: as inventories are costly
to produce, firms are strictly better off storing exactly what they sell. Second, the
firm with the smallest level of inventories cannot store in equilibrium, as it is better
off waiting for the second period to produce.
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Lemma 1 Any n-tuple of inventories q1 = (q
1
1, ..., q
n
1 ) such that:
(i) some firms are selling strictly less than their inventories, i.e. q1 ∈ B(ℓ) for ℓ =
n+ 1, ..., 2n,
(ii) firms who are selling strictly more than their inventories are keeping strictly
positive inventories,
cannot be an equilibrium.
Proof. Since inventories are costly to produce, if they were selling strictly less
than their inventories, firms would be strictly better off reducing unilaterally their
inventories. Situations in which some firms are selling less than their inventories
cannot be an equilibrium: (i) holds for any value of ρ non negative.
To prove (ii) let us examine the profit of firms selling strictly more than their
inventories. Consider q1 ∈ B(ℓ): the total profit of firms i = ℓ + 1, ..., n is given by
πi(ℓ) = (a−S∗(ℓ)) si∗(ℓ)−(1+ρ) c qi1−c (si∗(ℓ)−qi1) = (a−c−S∗(ℓ)) si∗(ℓ)−ρ c qi1.
As S∗(ℓ) and si∗(ℓ) are independent of qi1 for i = ℓ + 1, ..., n, this profit is strictly
decreasing in qi1. Remark that from the expression of the bounds of the region in
which firms 1 to ℓ are selling exactly their inventories, it is needed that qℓ+11 ≤
(a − c −∑ℓi=1 qi1)/(n − ℓ + 1). This condition is trivially satisfied for qℓ+11 = 0 and
consequently the deviation to qi1 = 0 for i = ℓ + 1, ..., n belongs to B(ℓ). (ii) holds:
no firm selling more than its inventories can keep positive inventories in equilibrium.
This property of the equilibrium holds also for firm n when firms 1 to n− 1 sell ex-
actly their inventories: this firm is better off minimizing its cost by storing nothing.‖
This lemma insures that the search for an equilibrium can be restricted to n-tuple
of inventories (q11, ..., q
n
1 ) such that in the sub-games that follow, a group of firms is
selling exactly its inventories while rivals are selling strictly more. Moreover it also
proves it is cost minimizing for firms selling strictly more than their inventories not
to store at all. This applies in particular to firm n when firms 1, ..., n−1 store in first
period. Consequently the search for an equilibrium can be restricted to n-tuple of
inventories (q11, ..., q
n
1 ) belonging to region B(ℓ) for ℓ = 1, ..., n− 1, with inventories
(qℓ+11 , ..., q
n
1 ) being equal to 0.
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Theorem 1 below and its corollary characterize the equilibria of the game. For
each number of firms competing over the two periods, and for every value of (a, c, ρ)
satisfying (A.1), these two results determine the n-tuple of inventories (q1∗1 , ..., q
n∗
1 )
stored by firms at the Nash-perfect equilibrium of the game. Equilibria are such
that a particular level of inventories are kept by ℓ firms, while n− ℓ are not storing,
under certain conditions on n and on the model parameters. The number of firms
storing, ℓ, and the individual inventories these firms keep, vary.
The proof of these two results is long and fastidious12. It consists in four steps.
First (step 1) we determine the conditions under which the Cournot-Nash outcome is
an equilibrium. Then (step 2) we determine the equilibrium values of inventories and
the conditions on the model parameters such that ℓ firms store. More specifically to
be a sub-game perfect equilibrium in which firms 1, ..., ℓ store and firms ℓ + 1, ..., n
do not, a n-tuple of inventories q∗1(ℓ) ≡ (q1∗1 , ..., qi∗1 , ..., qℓ∗1 , 0, ..., 0) must be such that:
(a) There is no profitable individual deviation from q∗1(ℓ) within B(ℓ): q
∗
1(ℓ) is
more profitable than (q1∗1 , ..., q
i−1∗
1 , q
i
1, q
i+1∗
1 , ..., q
ℓ∗
1 , 0, ..., 0) for any q
i
1 such that
q1 ∈ B(ℓ) and for any firm i = 1, ..., ℓ.
(b) No firm storing finds profitable to reduce inventories down to 0: q∗1(ℓ) is more
profitable than (q1∗1 , ..., q
i−1∗
1 , 0, q
i+1∗
1 , ..., q
ℓ∗
1 , 0, ..., 0) for any firm i ∈ {1, ..., ℓ}.
That is, firm i must not find profitable to join the group of firms producing
in second period only, to react optimally in period 2 to the inventories of the
firms storing: (b) determines a condition under which at least ℓ firms store.
(c) No firm not storing in first period finds profitable to increase inventories to join
the group of firms storing: q∗1(ℓ) is more profitable than (q
1∗
1 , ..., q
ℓ∗
1 , 0, ..., 0, q
i
1, 0, ..., 0)
for any qi1 such that q1 ∈ B(ℓ + 1) and for any firm i ∈ {ℓ+ 1, ..., n}. That is
(c) determines a condition under which at most ℓ firms store.
The conditions obtained in stages (a), (b) and (c) of step 2 are conditions on the
cost of storage ρ, and the model parameters a and c, that permits a given number
of firms ℓ to store given the number of firms in competition n. More precisely an
upper and a lower bound on the cost of storage13 are determined. These bounds
12See web appendix.
13More specifically the cost of storage relative to the difference between the demand intercept
and the marginal cost of production, ρc/(a− c).
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are both functions of the number of firms n in competition and the number of firms
storing ℓ. If the cost of storage exceeds the lower bound, then at most ℓ firms keep
positive inventories, while if the cost of storage is lower than the upper bound then
at least ℓ firms keep positive inventories. The level of inventories considered must
also be an optimum for the firms that keep it, and for exactly ℓ firms to store these
inventories, the cost of storage must be in between the two bounds. Then (step 3)
proves that the conditions on model parameters determined in step 2 do not define
an empty subset, and finally step 4 verifies that all possible values of the parameters
have been covered, hence ensuring the existence of an equilibrium.
Theorem 1 The game possesses an equilibrium in pure strategies for any n ≥ 2,
and a, c, and ρ satisfying (A.1).
Proof: See appendix B.‖
Corollary 1 It exists two sequences U ≡ {U(n, ℓ)}ℓ=1,...,n−2 and L ≡ {L(n, ℓ)}ℓ=1,...,n−2,
with U(n, ℓ) ≥ L(n, ℓ) for any ℓ = 1, ..., n− 2, given by
L(n, ℓ) ≡
(
n− ℓ+ 1− 2√n− ℓ)
(n− ℓ+ 1) (2ℓ√n− ℓ+ n− 2ℓ)
and
U(n, ℓ) ≡
(
n− ℓ+ 2− 2√n− ℓ+ 1)
(n− ℓ+ 1) (√n− ℓ+ 1(ℓ− 1) + n− ℓ+ 2) ,
which are such that:
• for ρc
a−c ≥ U(n, 1), the n-tuple (0, ..., 0) is an equilibrium,
• for any ℓ = 1, ..., n−2 such that L(n, ℓ) ≤ ρc
a−c ≤ U(n, ℓ), the n-tuple (q1∗1 , ..., qn∗1 )
where
qi∗1 = q
∗
1(ℓ) =
a− c− (n− ℓ+ 1)ρc
ℓ+ 1
for i = 1, ..., ℓ and qi∗1 = 0 for i = ℓ+1, ..., n
is an equilibrium,
• for ρc
a−c ≤ L(n, n− 2), the n-tuple (q∗1(n− 1), ..., q∗1(n− 1), 0) is an equilibrium.
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Proof: See appendix B.‖
The number of firms storing at equilibrium results from the trade-off between
a larger market share, obtained endogenously by an increase in inventories, and a
smaller margin due to the increase in competition and in the cost of operations.
The first case presented in the corollary above corresponds to the static Cournot-
Nash equilibrium, that occurs if the cost of storage ρ is large enough compared to
the model parameters a and c, given the intensity of competition. The second case
corresponds to a situation where a subset of ℓ firms is storing, while n−ℓ are not. As
we have shown in the proof of the theorem and its corollary, there may be multiple
equilibria for the same values of the model parameters: indeed U(n, ℓ) determines an
upper bound on ρ below which at least ℓ firms are storing, while L(n, ℓ) determines
a lower bound on ρ above which at most ℓ firms store. Since U(n, ℓ + 1) ≥ L(n, ℓ),
several possibilities for the number of firms storing and for individual inventories at
equilibrium may co-exist for a given value of the model parameters (a, c, ρ). Moreover
equilibria are asymmetric even if all firms are identical ex-ante: each firm that stores
sells individually more than what a firm that does not store does. Finally the last
case corresponds to the extreme situation of a very small cost of storage relative
to the other model parameters and the intensity of competition, such that all firms
store the product, apart one which prefers to wait the second period to produce and
sell.
Let us characterize some properties of the equilibria compared to the static
Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Since the market concentration is larger than what it
would be if storage were not possible, for the same model parameters and the same
number of firms in competition, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of concentra-
tion should be larger when firms are able to store than when they are not, i.e. larger
in our game than in static Cournot competition (everything else equal). Moreover
competition should be fiercer. Indeed we have:
Proposition 2 When firms hold inventories, the price-cost margin is strictly lower,
and the Herfindhal-Hirschman Index is striclty higher, than the value they obtain in
static Cournot competition.
Proof: First let us prove formally that the market is more competitive than a static
Cournot market. Using corollary 1 and proposition 1, the aggregate quantity sold
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when inventories are strictly positive is given by
S∗ =
ℓ (a− c− (n− ℓ+ 1)ρc)
(ℓ+ 1)(n− ℓ+ 1) +
(n− ℓ)(a− c)
n− ℓ+ 1
=
(n(ℓ + 1)− ℓ2) (a− c)
(ℓ+ 1)(n− ℓ+ 1) −
ℓρc
ℓ+ 1
(8)
that can be compared to SCN = n(a−c)
n+1
, the aggregate sales in static Cournot com-
petition. It comes:
S∗ ≥ SCN ⇔(n(ℓ+ 1)− ℓ
2) (a− c)
(ℓ+ 1)(n− ℓ+ 1) −
n(a− c)
n+ 1
≥ ℓρc
ℓ+ 1
⇔n(ℓ+ 1)− ℓ
2
ℓ(n− ℓ+ 1) −
n(ℓ+ 1)
ℓ(n+ 1)
≥ ρc
a− c
⇔(n+ 1) (n(ℓ + 1)− ℓ
2)− (n− ℓ+ 1)n(ℓ+ 1)
ℓ(n− ℓ+ 1)(n+ 1) ≥
ρc
a− c
⇔ℓ(ℓ+ 1)n− ℓ
2(n+ 1)
ℓ(n− ℓ+ 1)(n+ 1) ≥
ρc
a− c ⇔
(ℓ+ 1)n− ℓ(n+ 1)
(n− ℓ+ 1)(n+ 1) ≥
ρc
a− c
⇔ n− ℓ
(n− ℓ+ 1)(n+ 1) ≥
ρc
a− c. (9)
This condition is exactly the one that must be satisfied for q∗1(ℓ) to belong to B(ℓ)
obtained in (38); consequently the aggregate sales of the industry when firms hold
inventories are strictly larger than the aggregate sales obtained in static Cournot
competition. Hence the market price and the price-cost margin are smaller than in
static Cournot competition14.
Second, the HHI is larger when firms hold inventories than in static Cournot
competition. Indeed due to the fact that firms are identical, the equilibrium would
be symmetric in static Cournot competition, and market shares identical (equal to
1/n). As we proved in corollary 1, market shares differ across group of firms when
the output is stored, and the equilibrium is asymmetric. As the HHI is the sum of
squared market shares, this grants immediately that the HHI is larger when firms
hold inventories than in static Cournot competition, where it reaches its minimum.‖.
As we already explained, increasing inventories to credibly commit to gain market
shares has a larger profitability when a few firms compete on the market, while an
increase in the number of competitors reduces the margin and hence reduces the
14See Boyer and Moreaux ([1985], [1986]) for a similar result in the context of a Stackelberg
oligopoly.
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incentive to acquire market shares by investing in inventories. This suggests a non
monotonicity of the equilibrium in the number of competitors. We now confirm this
intuition:
Proposition 3 The number of firms storing ℓ and the industry inventories ℓq∗1(ℓ)
may be non-monotonic in the number of firms in competition n.
Proof. Let us examine the values of the bounds on ρc/(a − c) established for the
extreme cases, ℓ = 1 and ℓ = n− 2. We have:
U(n, 1) =
n+ 1− 2√n
n(n + 1)
(10)
L(n, 1) =
n− 2√n− 1
n(2
√
n− 1 + n− 2) (11)
U(n, n− 2) = 4− 2
√
3
3((n− 3)√3 + 4) (12)
L(n, n− 2) = 3− 2
√
2
3(2(n− 2)√2− n+ 4) . (13)
It is immediate to check that the lower bounds given by (12) and (13) are strictly
decreasing with respect to n. Moreover it is possible to plot as a function of n the
upper bounds given by (10) and (11) with a mathematical software (e.g. Maxima
or Mathematica), for values n ≥ 2, to prove that it is non monotonic (concave) in
n. By continuity of U(n, ℓ) and L(n, ℓ) with respect to ℓ, there is a subset of values
for ℓ in 1, ..., n− 2 for which U(n, ℓ) and L(n, ℓ) are non monotonic in n. Therefore,
for a given value of ρc/(a − c), the number of firms storing at equilibrium, that
results from the comparison of the sequences U and L with ρc/(a− c), may be non-
monotonic in the number of firms in competition, n. It follows that the aggregate
inventories in equilibrium ℓq∗1(ℓ) can also be non-monotonic in n.‖
It is possible to study the effect of an entry of competitors on the market by using
the corollary of Theorem 1 to compute in an example the number of firms storing
at equilibrium, the aggregate inventories kept by the industry, the aggregate sales
of firms that do not store, the aggregate industry sales, and compare these values to
the outcome of static Cournot competition when the number of competitors changes.
The table below produces an example for a = 2.5, c = 1, and ρ = 0.03, generated
with a spreadsheet software.
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[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
Let us briefly describe the content of the table. Column (1) indicates the number
of firms competing on the market, column (2) (respectively (3)) the minimal (resp.
maximal) number of firms storing at equilibrium. These numbers are directly coming
from the conditions on ρ expressed in the corollary, and whenever they are identical
we suppressed the one in column (2)15. Then column (4) (resp. (5)) presents the
aggregate level of inventories stored by the minimal (resp. maximal) number of
firms storing, while column (6) (resp. (7)) shows the aggregate sales of the firms
that are not storing when the number of firms storing is minimum (resp. maximum).
Column (8) (resp. (9)) presents the total sales of the industry when the number of
firms storing is minimal (resp. maximal), that can be compared to the aggregate
sales a static Cournot oligopoly would realize, computed in column (10) and equal
to n(a− c)/(n+ 1).
As the table presents in columns (2) and (3), there may be multiple equilibria.
Moreover as column (4) and (5) show, the minimal and the maximal number of
firms storing at equilibrium, as well as the corresponding aggregate inventories of
the industry, are non monotonic in the number of firms in competition n. That is
when the number of firms in competition increases, the number of firms storing and
the level of aggregate inventories both increase, to then decrease when the number of
firms in competition is large enough. This illustrates the trade-off we described: the
profitability of exerting some leadership by storing decreases the larger the number
of firms in competition for a given cost of storage. When the number of firms is large
enough, all the gains in volume obtained through leadership are offset by losses in
margin over a marginal cost that includes the cost of storage. In that case the unique
equilibrium is the Cournot-Nash one. This feature implies that the aggregate level
of inventories is non-monotonic in the number of competitors on the market. For
example when n = 6, there can be up to 3 firms storing, and industry sales equal
to 1.384 (in column (9)) are 7% higher than 1.286, the value they reach in static
Cournot competition (column (10)). For n = 13, up to 5 firms store and sales equal
to 1.447 are 3.8% higher than in static Cournot competition. For n = 19, up to
3 firms are storing and sales equal to 1.455 are 2% higher than in static Cournot
competition.
15It is replaced with a −; the same convention applies to the rest of the table.
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We also compute the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) when the number of
firms storing is minimal (resp. maximal), presented in column (11) (resp. (12)), that
can be compared to the HHI at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium (column (13)). Com-
petition and concentration may therefore simultaneously increase when the number
of firms decreases from perfect competition to oligopolistic market structure, and are
clearly larger than their values in Cournot competition. In the example for n = 6,
the HHI is 25% higher in our model than in Cournot (HHI = 2076 instead of 1666),
and twice higher for n = 19 (HHI = 1155 instead of 526)! Comparing our results
to the HHI thresholds from the U.S. Horizontal Mergers Guidelines16, the static
Cournot market with n = 10 firms would be unconcentrated (HHI = 1000), while
if 3 firms store as it is potentially the case at equilibrium, the HHI = 1619 would
make it fall into the category of moderately concentrated markets. Competition is
nonetheless fiercer.
We conclude this section by addressing two comments, first on the role of assump-
tion (A.1), second on the role of a small interest rate. If we relax (A.1) to consider
any type of market demand, we would still get asymmetric equilibria. However there
may be an additional upper limit on individual inventories to consider, in addition
to the conditions in the sets B(ℓ) we presented17.
By introducing the interest rate, we made first period production slightly more
costly than second period production. This allows us to rule out of the set of
equilibria the weakly dominated ones. If there were no interest rate, the ultimate
follower would be indifferent between producing in period 1 and producing in period
2, and if this firm produces the n-firms Cournot production in period 1, then all the
other firms are also better off producing a Cournot outcome in period 1. The result
we would obtain in our game would be a generalization to the case of an oligopoly
16of August 19, 2010
17In the duopoly game with ρ close to 0, this level is equal to the intersection between the curves
q11 =
a
2
− 1
2
q21 and q
2
1 =
a−c
2
− 1
2
q11 that is (q
1
1 , q
2
1) = (
a+c
3
, a−2c
3
). The role of assumption (A.1) is
to rule out credible threats of putting leaders with redundant inventories, by forcing prices to be
lower than the marginal cost when a follower increases its inventories to force the leader to sell less
than its inventories. Although Arvan [1985] identifies the possibility for a leader to be put with
redundant inventories in his duopoly setting, he does not show that for this threat to modify the
behaviour of the leader, it must be the case that the market price stays at a level such that the
follower realizes a non-negative profit. The fact that redundant production may matter has not
been analyzed by Saloner [1987], Pal ([1991], [1996]).
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of the result obtained for a duopoly by Saloner [1987], who shows that any pair
of inventories on the outer envelope of the Cournot reaction functions between the
two Stackelberg outcomes18 is an equilibrium in pure strategies. The interest rate
(or a cost of storage) is a selection device that forces the ultimate follower to wait
until period 2 to produce: this can be seen as a special case of the selection criterium
presented in the duopoly game by Pal ([1991], [1996])19, who consider more generally
cost differentials between periods. In an oligopoly the cost of storage is the economic
force that determines how many firms store and exert some leadership amongst all
the market competitors.
5 Conclusion
Without any other incentive than strategic to store, and in a perfectly symmetric
setting, this paper shows that it is possible to observe positive level of inventories
and asymmetric market shares at the equilibrium of a two-period Cournot oligopolis-
tic market, no matter the finite number of firms in competition. The rationale for
storing lies in the fact that inventories may be used to exert some market share
leadership, but at the cost of reduced margins. The main intuition is that by dump-
ing the cost of production of inventories in first period, firms obtain an endogenous
but fixed capacity from which they can sell at zero marginal cost in second period.
This marginal cost advantage translates into the search for leadership in our setting
of oligopolistic quantity competition with perfect substitutes: firms choose a level
of inventories such that their market share is increased compared to the static sit-
uation, competition is fiercer than when storage is impossible or the interaction is
static, and concentration is also larger. The number of firms that store at equilib-
rium varies with the number of firms in competition, but as some firms store before
selling while the others produce and sell simultaneously, our paper suggests that
”make-to-stock” and ”make-to-order” organizations of the operations may co-exist
at the Nash equilibrium of an oligopolistic interaction on the final market. Finally
an example illustrates the fact that observing larger industry inventories and a larger
18Under some extra assumptions on demand and cost missing in Saloner’s work relating to
assumption (A.1) and to the fact that leaders may be put with redundant production, as we
argued before.
19See also Robson [1990].
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number of firms storing is more likely under an oligopolistic market structure than
under market structures closer to the duopoly or to perfect competition: the number
of firms storing and the aggregate inventories are non monotonic in the number of
market participants.
Appendix
A. Proof of proposition 1
The proof is done in 3 steps. (Step 1 ) shows how to simplify each firm second period
problem to enlighten the role of period 1 production (i.e. inventories) and derives
the individual sales each firm chooses as a best reply to the aggregate sales of its
competitors, ŝi(S−i, qi1), which depends on inventories. This step has already been
completed at the beginning of section 3. It establishes that the best response of
any firm i, ŝi(S−i, qi1), is given by equation (7). Bear in mind that as we study an
oligopolistic competition, it is possible to restrict one’s attention to period 1 inven-
tories lower or equal to the individual production of a monopoly minimizing its cost
of production, denoted qm. Given the opportunity cost of producing in period 1 in-
stead of period 2, and given the demand and costs parameters assumed before, this
quantity is equal to qm = (a−c)/2. Consequently, the vector of period 1 production
is such that q1 ∈ [0, (a− c)/2]n.
In Step 2, we aggregate all the best replies to find the equilibrium aggregate sales
of the industry. To do so, we construct the best reply of each firm to the aggregate
quantity sold by the industry, ŝi(S, qi1), and we sum these functions over all firms to
obtain the industry best reply to an aggregate sales level,
∑
i∈I ŝ
i(S, qi1) = Ŝ(S, q1).
To construct the best reply ŝi(S, qi1), also known as the backward reaction mapping
(from Novshek 1984 terminology) we first determine the cumulative reaction to S−i
for firm i, S•i (S
−i, qi1) = {si + S−i/si = ŝi(S−i, qi1)}.
S•i (S
−i, qi1) =

1
2
(a− c+ S−i) if S−i ≤ a− c− 2qi1
qi1 + S
−i if S−i ∈ [a− c− 2qi1, a− 2qi1]
1
2
(a+ S−i) if S−i ≥ a− 2qi1
(14)
Then we invert it to obtain the inverse cumulative best response function S−ii (S, q
i
1)
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for firm i. As S•i (S
−i, qi1) is strictly increasing it has a unique inverse,
S−i(S, qi1) =

2S − (a− c) if S ∈ [a−c
2
, a− c− qi1]
S − qi1 if S ∈ [a− c− qi1, a− qi1]
2S − a if S ≥ a− qi1
(15)
Finally we solve for the individual sale si in {si/S − si = S−i(S, qi1)}, to obtain
the backward reaction mapping,
ŝi(S, qi1) =

(a− c)− S if S ∈ [(a− c)/2, a− c− qi1]
qi1 if S ∈ [a− c− qi1, a− qi1]
a− S if S ≥ a− qi1
(16)
where as in (7), given some industry sales S, firm i can either sell more than (first
line of (16)), or sell exactly (second line of (16)), or sell less than (third line of (16))
its inventories qi1. Under assumptions (A.1) and under the convention that firm i
owns larger inventories than firm i+1, summing all the backward reaction mappings
to obtain Ŝ(S, q1) can be done easily. Indeed for any level of industry sales S, all
firms are either selling at least their inventories or selling at most their inventories,
but it is not possible that some of them sell strictly more than their inventories,
while some others are selling strictly less. To put it differently the cut-off values for
S determining the reaction of an individual firm in (16) are ”nicely” ranked across
firms. To see this, first remark that
(a− c)/2 ≤ a− c− q11 ≤ ... ≤ a− c− qn1 ≤ a− c (17)
and
a− q11 ≤ ... ≤ a− qn1 . (18)
As justified in step 1, there is no loss of generality to restrict our attention to period
1 productions lower than qm = (a − c)/2. Consequently the lower bound in the
sequence of inequalities (18) can be minored, a−q11 ≥ (a+c)/2. It suffices to remark
that as a consequence of (A.1), the upper bound of the sequence of inequalities (17)
is lower than the lower bound of the sequence (18), i.e. a− c ≤ (a+ c)/2, to be able
to rank across all firms the cut-off values at which there are kinks in the backward
reaction mappings (16)
a− c− q11 ≤ ... ≤ a− c− qn1 ≤ a− q11 ≤ ... ≤ a− qn1 (19)
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For a level of industry sales S lower than a− c− q11, all firms are selling more than
their period 1 production and consequently the sum of all the backward reaction
mappings is simply equal to n times the expression in the first line of (16), (a−c)−S.
For S higher than a − c − q11 and lower than a − c − q21 , firm 1 is selling exactly
its inventories and firms 2 to n are selling strictly more: the sum of the backward
reaction mappings is equal to q11 plus n − 1 times (a − c) − S, ... and so on. For
industry sales higher than a − c − qn1 and lower than a − q11, all firms are selling
exactly their inventories, and
∑
i∈I ŝ
i(S, qi1) =
∑
i∈I q
i
1 = Q1. For S higher than
a − q11 and lower than a − q21 firm 1 sells less than its inventories and firms 2 to n
sell exactly their inventories:
∑
i∈I ŝ
i(S, qi1) is equal to a − S +
∑
i≥2 q
i
1, ... and so
on to complete the summation. To summarize, Ŝ(S, q1) is given by
Ŝ(S, q1) =

n(a− c− S) if S ∈ [(a− c)/2, a− c− q11]
(n− k)(a− c− S) +∑ki=1 qi1 if S ∈ [a− c− qk1 , a− c− qk+11 ]
for k = 1, ..., n− 1
... ...∑n
i=1 q
i
1 if S ∈ [a− c− qn1 , a− q11 ]
k(a− S) +∑ni=k+1 qi1 if S ∈ [a− qk1 , a− qk+11 ]
for k = 1, ..., n− 1
... ...
n(a− S) if S ≥ a− qn1
(20)
Step 3 determines the fixed points of Ŝ(S, q1). As there are 2n cut-off values
determining the different expressions of Ŝ, there are 2 n + 1 different expressions
and potentially 2n+1 different sub-game equilibria to find. We index the consecutive
lines from (20) by ℓ = 0, ..., 2 n: at line 0 all firms sell more than their inventories,
at line 1 firm 1 sells exactly its inventories and the others more,... and so on.
At line n all firms sell exactly their inventories and at line n + 1 firm 1 sells less
than its inventories while the others sell exactly their inventories, until line 2n. We
derive the fixed points of Ŝ(S, q1) line by line: for every line ℓ = 0, ..., 2n, there
is a unique equilibrium aggregate sales level S∗(ℓ). To this equilibrium industry
sales S∗(ℓ) corresponds a unique set of period 1 inventories B(ℓ) such that if the
vector of firms inventories q1 belongs to B(ℓ), then the equilibrium is S
∗(ℓ). Let us
describe these fixed points and the sets that are associated to them. The equilibrium
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in which all firms sell more than their inventories (line ℓ = 0) is characterized by
S∗(0) = n(a− c)/(n + 1). Inventories must be such that S∗(0) ≤ a− c− q11 that is
must belong to B(0) given by
B(0) =
{
q1 | q11 ≤ (a− c)/(n+ 1)
}
. (21)
For ℓ = 1, ..., n − 1, equilibrium aggregate sales are S∗(ℓ) = ((n − ℓ)(a − c) +∑ℓ
i=1 q
i
1)/(n− ℓ+ 1), and q1 must belong to B(ℓ) given by
B(ℓ) =
{
q1 | qℓ1 ≥ (a− c−
ℓ−1∑
i=1
qi1)/(n− ℓ+ 2), qℓ+11 ≤ (a− c−
ℓ∑
i=1
qi1)/(n− ℓ+ 1)
}
. (22)
For ℓ = n, S∗(n) =
∑n
i=1 q
i
1 and q1 must belong to B(n)
B(n) =
{
q1 | qn1 ≥ (a− c−
n−1∑
i=1
qi1)/2, q
1
1 ≤ (a−
n∑
i=2
qi1)/2
}
. (23)
For ℓ = n+1, ..., 2n− 1, S∗(ℓ) = ((ℓ− n)a+∑ni=ℓ−n+1 qi1)/(ℓ− n+1) and q1 ∈ B(ℓ)
such that
B(ℓ) =
{
q1 | qℓ−n1 ≥ (a−
n∑
i=ℓ−n+1
qi1)/(ℓ− n + 1), qℓ−n+11 ≤ (a−
n∑
i=ℓ−n+2
qi1)/(ℓ− n + 2)
}
. (24)
Finally for ℓ = 2n, S∗(2n) = na/(n+ 1) and q1 ∈ B(2n) such that
B(2n) = {q1/qn1 ≥ a/(n + 1)} . (25)
The intersection between (the interior of) two sets is empty, B(ℓ)
⋂
B(ℓ′) = ∅ for
ℓ 6= ℓ′, and the reunion of all sets ⋃ℓ=0,...,2nB(ℓ) encompasses exactly all the cases
for q1 we are interested in. We complete this proof by expressing the conditions
on inventories in terms of conditions on the marginal revenues to obtain our result.
Obviously,
q11 ≤
a− c
n + 1
⇔ m1
(
q11,
n− 1
n+ 1
(a− c)
)
≥ c
and so on... it remains to use the backward reaction mapping of each firm to obtain
individual sales:
Corollary 2 (to Proposition 1) For each equilibrium level of aggregate sales S∗(ℓ),
ℓ = 0, ..., 2n, there is a unique equilibrium vector of individual sales s∗(ℓ) given by:
1. if q1 ∈ B(0), si∗(0) = a−cn+1 for any i ∈ I,
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2. if q1 ∈ B(ℓ) for ℓ ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}, then si∗(ℓ) = qi1 for i = 1, ..., ℓ and
si∗(ℓ) =
a− c
n− ℓ+ 1 −
∑ℓ
i=1 q
i
1
n− ℓ+ 1 for i = ℓ+ 1, ..., n,
3. if q1 ∈ B(n) then si∗(n) = qi1 for all i ∈ I,
4. if q1 ∈ B(ℓ) for ℓ ∈ {n+ 1, ..., 2n− 1}, then si∗(ℓ) = qi1 for i = ℓ− n+ 1, ..., n
and
si∗(ℓ) =
a
ℓ− n + 1 −
∑n
i=ℓ−n+1 q
i
1
ℓ− n+ 1 for i = 1, ..., ℓ− n,
5. if q1 ∈ B(2n) then si∗(2n) = an+1 for any i ∈ I.
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Web appendix
B. Proof of theorem 1 and its corollary
Lemma 1 insures that the search for an equilibrium can be restricted to n-tuple of
inventories (q11, ..., q
n
1 ) such that in the sub-games that follow, a group of firms is
selling exactly its inventories while the rest is selling strictly more. Moreover it is
cost minimizing for firms selling strictly more than their inventories not to store at
all. Finally it is also cost minimizing for firm n not to store when all others keep
inventories in first period. Let us recall the result obtained in proposition 1 and
corollary 2: when ℓ firms store in first period, individual sales si∗(ℓ) and aggregate
sales S∗(ℓ) are respectively given by:
si∗(ℓ) = qi1 for i = 1, ..., ℓ (26)
si∗(ℓ) =
a− c−∑ℓi=1 qi1
n− ℓ + 1 for i = ℓ+ 1, ..., n (27)
S∗(ℓ) =
(n− ℓ)(a− c) +∑ℓi=1 qi1
n− ℓ+ 1 . (28)
For this sub-game equilibrium to occur, inventories must be such that q1 ∈ B(ℓ).
Using the expression of the marginal revenues mℓ(., .) and mℓ+1(., .) rewritten as in
(22), this condition writes:
qℓ1 ≥
a− c−∑ℓ−1i=1 qi1
n− ℓ+ 2 (29)
qℓ+11 ≤
a− c−∑ℓi=1 qi1
n− ℓ+ 1 . (30)
The proof consists of 4 steps. First (step 1) we determine the conditions under
which the Cournot-Nash outcome is an equilibrium. Then (step 2) we determine
equilibrium values of inventories and the conditions on the model parameters such
that ℓ firms store. Then (step 3) proves that the conditions on model parameters
determined in step 2 do not define an empty subset, and finally step 4 verifies that
all possible values of the parameters have been covered, hence ensuring the existence
of an equilibrium.
Step 1. Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
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Start with the case where no firm finds profitable to store. The profit oligopolists
obtain when not storing is equal to
π0∗ =
(
a− c
n+ 1
)2
(31)
that is the Cournot-Nash profit. For this outcome to be an equilibrium, we need to
check that parameters are such that no firm (say firm 1) finds profitable to increase
inventories. When deviating, firm 1 has to select in B(1) its preferred quantity.
Using the expression from proposition 1, the deviation chosen by firm 1 must be
such that q11 ≥ (a− c)/(n+1) and q11 ≤ a− c. The profit when deviating in B(1) to
be maximized in q11 is
π1 =
(
a− (n− 1)(a− c) + q
1
n
− (1 + ρ)c
)
q1, (32)
which has a maximum given by q1dev0 = (a − c− nρc)/2. The profit obtained when
deviating is maximal at this quantity if (a− c− nρc)/2 ≥ (a− c)/(n+ 1), which is
equivalent to
ρc ≤ (n− 1)(a− c)
n(n + 1)
, (33)
else the solution is to choose the deviation to the lower bound of the region q11 =
(a − c)/(n + 1), which is strictly dominated by waiting for the second period to
produce and sell the (same) Cournot-Nash quantity. The profit obtained at the
deviation q1dev0 is equal to:
π1dev0 =
(
a− c− nρc
2
√
n
)2
(34)
and the comparison with π0∗ gives immediately that π
1
dev0 ≥ π0∗ if ρc ≤ (n+1−2
√
n)(a−c)
n(n+1)
.
Remark that this condition defines a bound on ρc that satisfies (33) above, as n +
1− 2√n ≤ n− 1 for n ≥ 2. Therefore Cournot-Nash is an equilibrium of the game
if
ρc ≥ (n + 1− 2
√
n)(a− c)
n(n + 1)
. (35)
This condition ensures that no firm finds profitable to deviate from the n-tuple
(0, ..., 0), i.e. that at most 0 firms store.
Step 2. Equilibrium with ℓ firms storing.
32
Let ℓ denote the identity of the last firm storing in 1, ..., n−1. To be a sub-game
perfect equilibrium in which firms 1, ..., ℓ store and firms ℓ+1, ..., n do not, a n-tuple
of inventories (q1∗1 , ..., q
n∗
1 ) must be such that:
(a) There is no profitable individual deviation from q∗1 within B(ℓ):
(q1∗1 , ..., q
i−1∗
1 , q
i∗
1 , q
i+1∗
1 , ..., q
ℓ∗
1 , 0, ..., 0) is more profitable than
(q1∗1 , ..., q
i−1∗
1 , q
i
1, q
i+1∗
1 , ..., q
ℓ∗
1 , 0, ..., 0) for any q
i
1 such that q1 ∈ B(ℓ) and for any
firm i = 1, ..., ℓ.
(b) No firm storing finds profitable to reduce inventories down to 0 (in that devi-
ation this firm joins the group of firms producing in second period only and
reacts optimally to the inventories of the firms storing):
(q1∗1 , ..., q
i−1∗
1 , q
i∗
1 , q
i+1∗
1 , ..., q
ℓ∗
1 , 0, ..., 0) is more profitable than
(q1∗1 , ..., q
i−1∗
1 , 0, q
i+1∗
1 , ..., q
ℓ∗
1 , 0, ..., 0) for any firm i ∈ {1, ..., ℓ}.
That is (b) determines a condition under which at least ℓ firms store.
(c) No firm not storing in first period finds profitable to increase inventories to
join the group of firms storing:
(q1∗1 , ..., q
ℓ∗
1 , 0, ..., 0) is more profitable than (q
1∗
1 , ..., q
ℓ∗
1 , 0, ..., 0, q
i
1, 0, ..., 0) for
any qi1 such that q1 ∈ B(ℓ+ 1) and for any firm i ∈ {ℓ+ 1, ..., n}.
That is (c) determines a condition under which at most ℓ firms store.
Let us start with case (a).
(a) The profit of firms storing is given by πi(qi1, q
−i
1 ) =
(
a− (n−ℓ)(a−c)+
∑ℓ
i=1 q
i
1
n−ℓ+1
)
qi1−
(1+ρ)cqi1. Its maximization with respect to inventories q
i
1 leads to the following
first order conditions (FOCs) for firms 1, ..., ℓ:
a− (n− ℓ)(a− c)
n− ℓ+ 1 −
∑ℓ
i=1 q
i
1
n− ℓ+ 1 −
qi1
n− ℓ+ 1 − (1+ρ)c = 0 for i = 1, ..., ℓ. (36)
If an equilibrium exists it must satisfy all these FOCs. The candidate equilib-
rium for all firms storing i = 1, ..., ℓ, is therefore:
q∗1(ℓ) =
a− (n− ℓ + 1)(1 + ρ)c + (n− ℓ)c
ℓ+ 1
=
a− c− (n− ℓ+ 1)ρc
ℓ+ 1
. (37)
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Then we must check that the n-tuple obtained by satisfying all FOCs simul-
taneously is indeed ”interior” to the region B(ℓ), that is (q1∗1 , ..., q
ℓ∗
1 , 0, ..., 0)
satisfies the conditions (29) and (30). Using the expression of q∗1(ℓ), the first
one simplifies into a condition on the unit cost of producing and storing the
product in period 1, (1 + ρ)c:
q∗1(ℓ) ≥
a− c− (ℓ− 1)q∗1(ℓ)
n− ℓ+ 2 ⇔ q
∗
1(ℓ) ≥
a− c
n+ 1
⇔ a− c− (n− ℓ+ 1)ρc
ℓ+ 1
≥ a− c
n+ 1
⇔ρc ≤ (n− ℓ)(a− c)
(n + 1)(n− ℓ+ 1) . (38)
Similarly the second condition rewrites:
0 ≤ a− c− ℓq
∗
1(ℓ)
n− ℓ+ 1 ⇔ q
∗
1(ℓ) ≤
a− c
ℓ
⇔ (ℓ+ 1)(a− c) ≥
ℓa− ℓ(n− ℓ+ 1)(1 + ρ)c + ℓ(n− ℓ)c⇔ ℓ(n− ℓ+ 1)ρc ≥ −a + c (39)
which always hold under (A.1). Consequently to summarize case (a), the n-
tuple (q∗1(ℓ), ..., q
∗
1(ℓ), 0, ..., 0) with ℓ firms storing is in B(ℓ) if (38) holds, that
is if the cost of storage is small enough.
(b) As all firms earn the same payoff, the profit function of any firm storing q∗1(ℓ)
is equal to π∗(ℓ) = (a−S∗(ℓ)− (1+ ρ)c)q∗1(ℓ). Let us check it is not profitable
for firm ℓ to store nothing and wait for the second period to produce, while
firms 1, ..., ℓ− 1 store q∗1(ℓ).
We first need to determine to which subgame the deviation of firm ℓ leads
to, that is to which subgame the n-tuple of inventories (q∗1(ℓ), ..., q
∗
1(ℓ), 0, ..., 0)
with only ℓ − 1 firms storing leads to, that is the equilibrium sales of the
oligopolists. The conditions for firms 1 to ℓ−1 to sell exactly their inventories
while firms ℓ to n store nothing (and wait for the second period to produce)
are obtained by replacing ℓ with ℓ− 1 in (29) and (30):
qℓ−11 ≥
a− c−∑ℓ−2i=1 qi1
n− ℓ + 3 (40)
qℓ1 ≤
a− c−∑ℓ−1i=1 qi1
n− ℓ+ 2 . (41)
Replacing each qi1 by q
∗
1(ℓ) for i = 1, ..., ℓ− 1 and qℓ1 by 0 in these inequalities
gives a condition on the level q∗1(ℓ) of individual inventories kept by firms
1, ..., ℓ− 1:
q∗1(ℓ) ≥
a− c− (ℓ− 2)q∗1(ℓ)
n− ℓ+ 3 ⇔ q
∗
1(ℓ) ≥
a− c
n + 1
(42)
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and
0 ≤ a− c− (ℓ− 1)q
∗
1(ℓ)
n− ℓ + 2 ⇔ q
∗
1(ℓ) ≤
a− c
ℓ− 1 . (43)
We know from the first line in (38) and (39) that to be such that q∗1(ℓ) ∈ B(ℓ),
q∗1(ℓ) must verify q
∗
1(ℓ) ≥ (a−c)/(n+1) and q∗1(ℓ) ≤ (a−c)/ℓ. Respecting these
two conditions imply that (42) and (43) also hold. Consequently the deviation
of firm ℓ to a zero level of inventories when firms 1, ..., ℓ− 1 store each q∗1(ℓ) is
such that the n-tuple (q∗1(ℓ), ..., q
∗
1(ℓ), 0, ..., 0) with ℓ − 1 firms storing belongs
to B(ℓ− 1).
Substituting ℓ for ℓ−1 in (27), firms ℓ, ..., n produce in second period a quantity
given by
s∗(ℓ− 1) = a− c− (ℓ− 1)q
∗
1(ℓ)
n− ℓ+ 2 , (44)
and the aggregate quantity sold is equal to:
S∗(ℓ− 1) = (n− ℓ+ 1)(a− c) + (ℓ− 1)q
∗
1(ℓ)
n− ℓ + 2 . (45)
Consequently we can compute and compare the profits of firm ℓ with and
without deviating. Firm ℓ’s profit when storing q∗1(ℓ) is larger than the profit
it can obtain from not storing and waiting to the second period to produce
and sell s∗(ℓ− 1) when all other firms 1, ..., ℓ− 1 store q∗1(ℓ) if
π∗(ℓ) ≡ (a− S∗(ℓ)− (1 + ρ)c) q∗1(ℓ) ≥
(a− c− S∗(ℓ− 1)) sℓ∗(ℓ− 1) ≡ πℓdev. (46)
Checking that this deviation is not profitable gives another set of conditions
on q∗1(ℓ) we need to compare with the conditions obtained in (a).
Let us start to rewrite the profit obtained by firm ℓ when it produces q∗1(ℓ) in
first period using (28):
π∗(ℓ) =
(
a + (n− ℓ)c− ℓq∗1(ℓ)
n− ℓ+ 1 − (1 + ρ)c
)
q∗1(ℓ) =
(
(ℓ+ 1)q∗1(ℓ)− ℓq∗1(ℓ)
n− ℓ+ 1
)
q∗1(ℓ)
=
1
n− ℓ+ 1
(
a− c− (n− ℓ+ 1)ρc
ℓ + 1
)2
(47)
Remark that (a−c− (n− ℓ+1)ρc) in the last expression is positive since q∗1(ℓ)
is positive under (39).
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Similarly the profit of firm ℓ when deviating to qℓ1 = 0 is equal to:
πℓdev =
(
a− c− (n− ℓ+ 1)(a− c)
n− ℓ+ 2 −
(ℓ− 1)q∗1(ℓ)
n− ℓ+ 2
)
× a− c− (ℓ− 1)q
∗
1(ℓ)
n− ℓ+ 2
=
(
a− c− (ℓ− 1)q∗1(ℓ)
n− ℓ+ 2
)2
=
(
2(a− c) + (ℓ− 1)(n− ℓ+ 1)ρc
(n− ℓ+ 2)(ℓ+ 1)
)2
. (48)
From its definition in the second line of the expression above, the profit πℓdev
is proportional to the square of a − c − (ℓ − 1)q∗1(ℓ), which is positive under
(39). Consequently the comparison between the two profits reduces to the
comparison between the terms that are squared:
π∗(ℓ) ≥ πℓdev ⇔
a− c− (n− ℓ+ 1)ρc
(ℓ+ 1)
√
n− ℓ + 1 ≥
2(a− c) + (ℓ− 1)(n− ℓ+ 1)ρc
(ℓ+ 1)(n− ℓ+ 2)
⇔(n− ℓ+ 2)(a− c)− (n− ℓ+ 2)(n− ℓ+ 1)ρc ≥
2
√
n− ℓ+ 1(a− c) +√n− ℓ+ 1(ℓ− 1)(n− ℓ+ 1)ρc
⇔(n− ℓ+ 1)
(√
n− ℓ+ 1(ℓ− 1) + n− ℓ+ 2
)
ρc
≤
(
n− ℓ+ 2− 2√n− ℓ+ 1
)
(a− c) (49)
As the coefficient in factor of ρc is positive, this is equivalent to
ρc ≤
(
n− ℓ+ 2− 2√n− ℓ+ 1) (a− c)
(n− ℓ+ 1) (√n− ℓ+ 1(ℓ− 1) + n− ℓ + 2) . (50)
To summarize case (b) if the cost of storage ρc verifies the condition above,
the deviation from qℓ1 = q
∗
1(ℓ) to q
ℓ
1 = 0 is not profitable for firm ℓ; else it is
profitable. Therefore respecting the condition (50) above ensures that at least
ℓ firms are storing.
(c) We already proved that firm n with the lowest level of inventories is always
better off not storing at all. Consequently we do not need to check whether
this firm finds profitable to store when firms 1, ..., n− 1 are storing, that is for
ℓ = n− 1. In that case only the bounds we determined in (a) and (b) matter.
However we need to check that storing is not profitable for firms ℓ+1, ..., n−1
that do not store when ℓ ≤ n− 2.
Since all firms who are selling more than their inventories in period 1 are not
storing at all in period 1, it suffices to check whether a profitable deviation
exists for one of them, say ℓ+1, to prove (c). First, this firm must choose qℓ+11
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such that the (ℓ+1)-tuple (q∗1(ℓ), ..., q
∗
1(ℓ), q
ℓ+1
1 , 0, ..., 0) belongs to B(ℓ+1), i.e.
is such that firms 1 to ℓ+ 1 sell their inventories and the others do not store.
Indeed if it were not the case, firm ℓ + 1 would sell the same quantity than
firms ℓ + 2 to n while bearing the extra cost of carrying inventories, which of
course would not be profitable. Second, the deviation q ı¯+11 chosen must also be
such that the profit πℓ+1dev (q
ℓ+1
1 ) is maximal. We check these conditions in turn.
Adapting again (29) and (30) to determine B(ℓ + 1), qℓ+11 is sold in second
period when firms 1, ..., ℓ store each q∗1(ℓ) if it verifies the two conditions:
qℓ+11 ≥
a− c− ℓq∗1(ℓ)
n− ℓ+ 1 (51)
0 ≤ a− c− ℓq
∗
1(ℓ)− qℓ+11
n− ℓ ⇔ q
ℓ+1
1 ≤ a− c− ℓq∗1(ℓ). (52)
The fact that q∗1(ℓ) verifies (39) insures that q
∗
1(ℓ) ≤ (a − c)/ℓ, and therefore
a− c− ı¯q∗1(ℓ) ≥ 0 so that the lower and the upper bounds on qℓ+11 given in (51)
are non-negative and such that a − c − ℓq∗1(ℓ) > a−c−ℓq
∗
1(ℓ)
n−ℓ+1 for any n ≥ ℓ + 1.
Moreover since
a− c− ℓq∗1(ℓ) =
a− c+ ℓ(n− ℓ+ 1)ρc
ℓ+ 1
(53)
the RHS of the two inequalities (51) and (52) above define two bounds U and
D functions of (1 + ρ)c such that:
qℓ+11 ≥
a− c + ℓ(n− ℓ + 1)ρc
(ℓ+ 1)(n− ℓ + 1) ≡ D (54)
qℓ+11 ≤
a− c + ℓ(n− ℓ + 1)ρc
ℓ+ 1
≡ U. (55)
If these two conditions hold then aggregate sales are given by Proposition 1:
S∗(ℓ+ 1) =
(n− ℓ− 1)(a− c) + ℓq∗1(ℓ) + qℓ+11
n− ℓ (56)
and the profit of firm ℓ+ 1 is equal to:
πℓ+1 =
(
a− (n− ℓ− 1)(a− c) + ℓq
∗
1(ℓ) + q
ℓ+1
1
n− ℓ − (1 + ρ)c
)
qℓ+11 . (57)
This profit is maximal when qℓ+11 solves the first order condition
a− c− (n− ℓ− 1)(a− c) + ℓq
∗
1(ℓ) + q
ℓ+1
1
n− ℓ − ρc−
1
n− ℓq
ℓ+1
1 = 0 (58)
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whose solution in qℓ+11 is:
qℓ+1dev =
a− c− (n− ℓ)ρc− ℓq∗1(ℓ)
2
=
1
2
(
a− c− (n− ℓ)ρc− ℓa− c− (n− ℓ+ 1)ρc
ℓ + 1
)
=
a− c− (ℓ+ 1)(n− ℓ)ρc+ ℓ(n− ℓ+ 1)ρc
2(ℓ+ 1)
=
a− c− (n− 2ℓ)ρc
2(ℓ+ 1)
.
(59)
We have qℓ+1dev ≥ U if and only if a−c−(n−2ℓ)ρc2(ℓ+1) ≥ a−c+ℓ(n−ℓ+1)ρcℓ+1 that is
−(a− c) ≥ (2ℓ(n− ℓ) + n) ρc (60)
which is impossible as the LHS of this inequality is negative while the RHS is
positive. Consequently we always have qℓ+1dev < U .
Similarly qℓ+1dev ≤ D if and only if
a− c− (n− 2ℓ)ρc
2(ℓ+ 1)
≤ a− c+ ℓ(n− ℓ+ 1)ρc
(ℓ+ 1)(n− ℓ+ 1)
⇔(n− ℓ + 1)(a− c− (n− 2ℓ)ρc) ≤ 2(a− c) + 2ℓ(n− ℓ+ 1)ρc
⇔(n− ℓ− 1)(a− c) ≤ n(n− ℓ+ 1)ρc⇔ n− ℓ− 1
n(n− ℓ+ 1)(a− c) ≤ ρc. (61)
Consequently if ρc ≥ n−ℓ−1
n(n−ℓ+1)(a−c) then by concavity of the profit (57) in qℓ+11 ,
the deviation to consider is qℓ+1dev′′ = D instead of q
ℓ+1
dev . This case is analyzed in
(c.1) below. If on the other hand ρc ≤ n−ℓ−1
n(n−ℓ+1)(a − c) then the deviation to
consider is qℓ+1dev . This case is analyzed in (c.2) below.
Sub-case (c.1): ρc ≥ n−ℓ−1
n(n−ℓ+1)(a − c). In that case firm ℓ + 1 optimum in
B(ℓ + 1) is to choose qℓ+1dev′ =
a−c−ℓq∗1(ℓ)
n−ℓ+1 . As recalled in the introduction of
this proof the quantity sold by firm ℓ + 1 when it does not store is given by
s(ℓ+1)∗(ℓ) = (a−c− ı¯q∗1(ℓ))/(n−ℓ+1), which is identical to qℓ+1dev′ . Consequently
aggregate sales S∗(ℓ + 1) and S∗(ℓ) are identical to each other for the output
choices of firm ℓ + 1 we consider. As production is more costly in first than
in second period due to discounting, it is clearly not profitable for firm ℓ + 1
to deviate. Consequently for these values of ρc, ℓ + 1 does not deviate from
qℓ+1∗1 = 0.
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Sub-case (c.2): ρc ≤ n−ℓ−1
n(n−ℓ+1)(a−c). In that case firm ℓ+1 optimum in B(ℓ+1)
is to choose qℓ+1dev . This deviation is not profitable if the profit obtained by not
storing exceeds the profit obtained by choosing qℓ+1dev above, that is:
πℓ+1∗ ≥ πℓ+1dev
⇔ (a− c− S∗(ℓ)) s(ℓ+1)∗(ℓ) ≥ (a− S∗(ℓ+ 1)− (1 + ρ)c) qℓ+1dev (62)
where
S∗(ℓ+ 1) =
(
(n− ℓ− 1)(a− c) + ℓq∗1(ℓ) + qℓ+1dev
)
/(n− ℓ) (63)
S∗(ℓ) = ((n− ℓ)(a− c) + ℓq∗1(ℓ)) /(n− ℓ+ 1) (64)
s(ℓ+1)∗(ℓ) = (a− c− ℓq∗1(ℓ)) /(n− ℓ+ 1). (65)
Substituting these terms in πℓ+1dev and using the fact that
qℓ+1dev = (a− c− (n− ℓ)ρc− ℓq∗1(ℓ)) /2, it comes:
πℓ+1dev =
(
a− c− ℓq∗1(ℓ)− qℓ+1dev − (n− ℓ)ρc
n− ℓ
)
qℓ+1dev
=
(a− c− (n− ℓ)ρc− ℓq∗1(ℓ))2
4(n− ℓ) =
(a− c− (n− 2ℓ)ρc)2
4(n− ℓ)(ℓ+ 1)2 . (66)
Similarly when firm ℓ + 1 chooses not to store, the profit πℓ+1∗ it obtains can
be simplified, using 53, into:
πℓ+1∗ =
(
a− c− ℓq∗1(ℓ)
n− ℓ+ 1
)2
=
(
a− c + ℓ(n− ℓ + 1)ρc
(n− ℓ+ 1)(ℓ+ 1)
)2
. (67)
Then since qℓ+1dev and s
(ℓ+1)∗(ℓ) are positive, the profit comparison is equivalent
to compare the terms that are squared:
πℓ+1∗ ≥ πℓ+1dev ⇔
a− c+ ℓ(n− ℓ+ 1)ρc
(n− ℓ+ 1)(ℓ+ 1) ≥
a− c− (n− 2ℓ)ρc
2
√
n− ℓ(ℓ+ 1)
⇔(n− ℓ+ 1)
(
2ℓ
√
n− ℓ+ n− 2ℓ
)
ρc ≥
(
n− ℓ+ 1− 2√n− ℓ
)
(a− c) (68)
The coefficient in front of (a − c) on the RHS of this inequality is always
positive, and the coefficient 2ℓ
√
n− ℓ + n − 2ℓ in front of ρc on the LHS as
well: indeed it defines a function of n that is strictly increasing. Therefore
2ℓ
√
n− ℓ + n − 2ℓ is strictly larger than the value it takes for the smallest n
possible, n = ℓ+ 1,
2ℓ
√
n− ℓ+ n− 2ℓ ≥ 2ℓ√ℓ+ 1− ℓ+ ℓ+ 1− 2ℓ = ℓ+ 1 ≥ 0. (69)
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Therefore
πℓ+1∗ ≥ πℓ+1dev ⇔ ρc ≥
(
n− ℓ+ 1− 2√n− ℓ) (a− c)
(n− ℓ+ 1) (2ℓ√n− ℓ+ n− 2ℓ) . (70)
We can compare this bound with the bound of region (c.2) by simply comparing
the terms in factor of a− c. It comes:
n− ℓ + 1− 2√n− ℓ
(n− ℓ+ 1) (2ℓ√n− ℓ+ n− 2ℓ) ≤ n− ℓ− 1n(n− ℓ+ 1) (71)
if and only if
n
(
n− ℓ+ 1− 2√n− ℓ
)
≤
(
2ℓ
√
n− ℓ+ n− 2ℓ
)
(n− ℓ− 1) (72)
Collecting the terms multiplied by 2
√
n− ℓ and separating them from the rest
gives
0 ≤2√n− ℓ (n + ℓ(n− ℓ− 1))− n(n− ℓ+ 1) + (n− 2ℓ)(n− ℓ− 1)
⇔ 0 ≤2√n− ℓ(n− ℓ)(ℓ+ 1)− n(n− ℓ)− n+ n(n− ℓ)− n− 2ℓ(n− ℓ) + 2ℓ
⇔ 0 ≤2√n− ℓ(n− ℓ)(ℓ+ 1)− 2(n− ℓ)(ℓ+ 1)
⇔ 0 ≤2(√n− ℓ− 1)(n− ℓ)(ℓ+ 1). (73)
Remark that
√
n− ℓ− 1 ≥ 0. Therefore the comparison between this bound
and the bound of region (c.2) ensures that firm ℓ + 1 does not find profitable
to deviate from qℓ+11 = 0 if (1 + ρ)c satisfies(
n− ℓ+ 1− 2√n− ℓ) (a− c)
(n− ℓ+ 1) (2ℓ√n− ℓ+ n− 2ℓ) ≤ ρc ≤ (n− ℓ− 1)(a− c)n(n− ℓ+ 1) (74)
else it does.
To summarize case (c), firm ℓ + 1 does not find profitable to deviate from
qℓ+11 = 0 to q
ℓ+1
dev if
ρc ≥ n− ℓ + 1− 2
√
n− ℓ
(n− ℓ+ 1) (2ℓ√n− ℓ+ n− 2ℓ)(a− c), (75)
while if
ρc ≤ n− ℓ+ 1− 2
√
n− ℓ
(n− ℓ+ 1) (2ℓ√n− ℓ+ n− 2ℓ)(a− c) (76)
it does. Respecting the condition (75) above ensures that at most ℓ firms store.
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Step 3. Non-emptiness of the set of parameters such that an equilibrium with ℓ firms
storing exists.
To start with, remark that the bound on ρc we obtained in (50) of step (b) is
lower than the bound we obtained in (38) of step (a). The comparison is equivalent
to verify that
n− ℓ+ 2− 2√n− ℓ+ 1
(n− ℓ+ 1) (√n− ℓ+ 1(ℓ− 1) + n− ℓ+ 2) ≤ n− ℓ(n+ 1)(n− ℓ + 1)
⇔
(√
n− ℓ+ 1(ℓ− 1) + n− ℓ+ 2
)
(n− ℓ) ≥ (n+ 1)
(
n− ℓ+ 2− 2√n− ℓ+ 1
)
⇔− (ℓ+ 1)(n− ℓ+ 2) + ((ℓ− 1)(n− ℓ) + 2(n+ 1))√n− ℓ+ 1 ≥ 0. (77)
Remark that (ℓ− 1)(n − ℓ) + 2(n + 1) = n + nℓ − ℓ2 + ℓ + 2 = (ℓ + 1)(n− ℓ + 2);
then the inequality above is equivalent to (ℓ + 1)(n − ℓ + 2) (√n− ℓ+ 1− 1) ≥ 0
which always hold. Then we need to compare the bound obtained in (50) with the
bound determined by (75). This is again equivalent to compare the terms in factor
of (a− c). We have
n− ℓ+ 2− 2√n− ℓ+ 1
(n− ℓ+ 1) (√n− ℓ+ 1(ℓ− 1) + n− ℓ+ 2) ≥ n− ℓ+ 1− 2
√
n− ℓ
(n− ℓ+ 1) (2ℓ√n− ℓ+ n− 2ℓ)
⇔
(
2ℓ
√
n− ℓ+ n− 2ℓ
)(
n− ℓ+ 2− 2√n− ℓ+ 1
)
≥(√
n− ℓ+ 1(ℓ− 1) + n− ℓ + 2
)(
n− ℓ+ 1− 2√n− ℓ
)
⇔(n− ℓ+ 2)(−ℓ− 1) + (n− ℓ+ 2)(ℓ+ 1)2√n− ℓ
+ (−2(n− 2ℓ)− (ℓ− 1)(n− ℓ+ 1))√n− ℓ+ 1
+ (−4ℓ+ 2(ℓ− 1))√n− ℓ√n− ℓ + 1 ≥ 0
⇔(n− ℓ+ 2)(ℓ+ 1)
(
2
√
n− ℓ− 1
)
+
(−n + 2ℓ− nℓ+ ℓ2 + 1)√n− ℓ+ 1− 2(ℓ+ 1)√n− ℓ√n− ℓ+ 1 ≥ 0 (78)
Remark that −n+ 2ℓ− nℓ+ ℓ2 + 1 = (ℓ+ 1)(−n+ ℓ+ 1). The inequality above
can be simplified by dividing both sides by ℓ+ 1, giving
(n− ℓ+2)
(
2
√
n− ℓ− 1
)
− (n− ℓ− 1)√n− ℓ+ 1− 2√n− ℓ√n− ℓ+ 1 ≥ 0. (79)
The LHS of the inequality above defines a function of n−ℓ that is strictly increasing.
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Indeed the derivative of the LHS with respect to n− ℓ is equal to
2
√
n− ℓ− 1 + n− ℓ + 2√
n− ℓ −
n− ℓ− 1 + 2√n− ℓ
2
√
n− ℓ −
√
n− ℓ+ 1
(
1 +
1√
n− ℓ
)
(80)
which is positive after reducing to the same denominator 2
√
(n− ℓ)(n− ℓ+ 1) and
verifying the sign of the numerator. Indeed let us change temporarily the notation,
introducing x = n− ℓ. Then it rewrites:
2
√
x− 1 + x+ 2√
x
− x− 1 + 2
√
x
2
√
x+ 1
−√x+ 1
(
1 +
1√
x
)
(81)
which is, by multiplying by 2
√
x(x+ 1), of the same sign than:
(2
√
x− 1)2
√
x(x+ 1) + (x+ 2)2
√
x+ 1− (x− 1 + 2√x)√x− 2√x(x+ 1)
(
1 +
1√
x
)
=4x
√
x+ 1− 2
√
x(x+ 1) + 2(x+ 2)
√
x+ 1− (x− 1)√x− 2x− 2(x+ 1)√x− 2(x+ 1)
=(6x+ 4)
√
x+ 1− 2
√
x(x+ 1)− (3x+ 1)√x− 4x− 2
=(6x+ 4− 2√x)√x+ 1− (4x+ 2 + (3x+ 1)√x). (82)
Then
(6x+ 4− 2√x)√x+ 1− (4x+ 2 + (3x+ 1)√x) ≥ 0
⇔(6x+ 4− 2√x)2(x+ 1) ≥ (4x+ 2 + (3x+ 1)√x)2
⇔(x+ 1)(6x+ 4)2 − 4(6x+ 4)(x+ 1)√x+ 4x(x+ 1) ≥
(4x+ 2)2 + 2(4x+ 2)(3x+ 1)
√
x+ x(3x+ 1)2
⇔(x+ 1)(6x+ 4)2 + 4x(x+ 1)− (4x+ 2)2 − x(3x+ 1)2 ≥
4(6x+ 4)(x+ 1)
√
x− 2(4x+ 2)(3x+ 1)√x
⇔x(6x+ 4− 3x− 1)(6x+ 4 + 3x+ 1) + (6x+ 4− 4x− 2)(6x+ 4 + 4x+ 2) + 4x(x+ 1) ≥
(24x2 + 40x+ 16− 24x2 − 20x− 4)√x
⇔x(3x+ 3)(9x+ 5) + (2x+ 2)(10x+ 6) + 4x(x+ 1) ≥ (20x+ 12)√x
⇔(x+ 1)(3x(9x+ 5) + 20x+ 12 + 4x) ≥ (20x+ 12)√x
⇔(x+ 1)(27x2 + 39x+ 12) ≥ (20x+ 12)√x
⇔(x+ 1)2(27x+ 12) ≥ (20x+ 12)√x (83)
which holds for any x ≥ 1. Therefore the LHS of the inequality (79) defines a
function of n − ℓ that is strictly increasing. Then as n− ℓ ≥ 1, it suffices to check
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that
(n− ℓ+2)
(
2
√
n− ℓ− 1
)
− (n− ℓ− 1)√n− ℓ+ 1− 2√n− ℓ√n− ℓ+ 1 ≥ 0 (84)
for n − ℓ = 1. It simplifies into 3 − 2√2 ≥ 0 which always holds. To conclude
this part of proof the n-tuple (q1∗1 , ..., q
ℓ∗
1 , q
ℓ+1∗
1 , ..., q
n∗
1 ) = (q
∗
1(ℓ), ..., q
∗
1(ℓ), 0, ..., 0) is
an equilibrium in pure strategies of the game if and only if
(n− ℓ+ 2− 2√n− ℓ+ 1)(a− c)
(n− ℓ+ 1) (√n− ℓ+ 1(ℓ− 1) + n− ℓ+ 2) ≥ ρc ≥ (n− ℓ+ 1− 2
√
n− ℓ)(a− c)
(n− ℓ + 1) (2ℓ√n− ℓ+ n− 2ℓ) .
(85)
Step 4: all possible values of the model parameters are covered.
It remains to prove that we have covered all possible values of the model parame-
ters. We established in steps 1 and 2 conditions on ρ such that an equilibrium exists,
for any values of a and c satisfying (A.1). We can now check that these conditions
cover all possible values of ρ for a and c satisfying (A.1). Let us rewrite the second
condition as:
ρc
a− c ≥
(
n− ℓ+ 1− 2√n− ℓ)
(n− ℓ+ 1) (2ℓ√n− ℓ+ n− 2ℓ) ≡ L(n, ℓ) (86)
ρc
a− c ≤
(
n− ℓ+ 2− 2√n− ℓ+ 1)
(n− ℓ+ 1) (√n− ℓ+ 1(ℓ− 1) + n− ℓ+ 2) ≡ U(n, ℓ) (87)
First remark that U(n, 1) = n+1−2
√
n
n(n+1)
. This is the bound we determined in for the
Cournot-Nash to be an equilibrium. Consequently for ρc
a−c ≥ U(n, 1), the Cournot-
Nash is an equilibrium of the game. Second, we prove now that U(n, ℓ+1) ≥ L(n, ℓ)
for any ℓ = 1, ..., n − 2, meaning that the game may have several equilibria for the
same set of parameters. Indeed, bearing in mind that the numerators of L(n, ℓ) and
U(n, ℓ) are positive for any ℓ,
U(n, ℓ + 1) ≥ L(n, ℓ)
⇔
(
n− ℓ+ 1− 2√n− ℓ)
(n− ℓ) (ℓ√n− ℓ+ n− ℓ + 1) ≥
(
n− ℓ+ 1− 2√n− ℓ)
(n− ℓ+ 1) (2ℓ√n− ℓ + n− 2ℓ)
⇔(n− ℓ)
(
ℓ
√
n− ℓ+ n− ℓ+ 1
)
≤ (n− ℓ + 1)
(
2ℓ
√
n− ℓ+ n− 2ℓ
)
⇔(2(n− ℓ+ 1)− (n− ℓ))ℓ√n− ℓ− (n− ℓ+ 1)ℓ ≥ 0
⇔(n− ℓ+ 2)ℓ√n− ℓ− (n− ℓ+ 1)ℓ ≥ 0
⇔(n− ℓ+ 2)√n− ℓ− (n− ℓ+ 1) ≥ 0 (88)
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which always hold. Finally, the condition we established for ℓ = n − 1 is exactly
ρc
a−c ≤ L(n, n − 2). Consequently we have covered all possible values of ρ, and the
game always possesses an equilibrium in pure strategies.
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Table 1: Computations of the equilibria and comparison with Cournot-Nash: Example.
ρ = 0.03 a = 2.5 c = 1
n ℓ min. ℓ max. ℓ× qi∗
1
at (2) ℓ× qi∗
1
at (3) (n− ℓ)× si∗ at (2) (n − ℓ)× si∗ at (3) S∗ at (2) S∗ at (3) S∗ at Cournot HHI at (2) HHI at (3) HHI at (10)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
2 - 1 - 0.720 - 0.390 - 1.110 1.000 - 5441.928 5000.000
3 - 1 - 0.705 - 0.530 - 1.235 1.125 - 4179.547 3333.333
4 - 2 - 0.940 - 0.373 - 1.313 1.200 - 2965.420 2500.000
5 2 3 0.920 1.058 0.435 0.295 1.355 1.353 1.250 2648.521 2275.686 2000.000
6 2 3 0.900 1.035 0.480 0.349 1.380 1.384 1.286 2429.112 2076.586 1666.667
7 3 4 1.013 1.104 0.390 0.297 1.403 1.401 1.313 1930.567 1702.195 1428.571
8 3 4 0.990 1.080 0.425 0.336 1.415 1.416 1.333 1812.109 1595.088 1250.000
9 3 5 0.968 1.125 0.456 0.300 1.424 1.425 1.350 1710.123 1357.341 1111.111
10 3 5 0.945 1.100 0.486 0.333 1.431 1.433 1.364 1619.032 1286.101 1000.000
11 3 5 0.923 1.075 0.513 0.364 1.436 1.439 1.375 1535.725 1222.482 909.091
12 3 5 0.900 1.050 0.540 0.394 1.440 1.444 1.385 1458.333 1164.109 833.333
13 3 5 0.878 1.025 0.566 0.422 1.443 1.447 1.393 1385.667 1109.641 769.231
14 2 4 0.740 0.936 0.702 0.513 1.442 1.449 1.400 1514.957 1168.819 714.286
15 2 4 0.720 0.912 0.724 0.539 1.444 1.451 1.406 1436.043 1113.075 666.667
16 2 4 0.700 0.888 0.747 0.565 1.447 1.453 1.412 1360.934 1059.841 625.000
17 2 4 0.680 0.864 0.769 0.591 1.449 1.455 1.417 1289.254 1008.862 588.235
18 2 3 0.660 0.765 0.791 0.689 1.451 1.454 1.421 1220.719 1072.360 555.556
19 2 3 0.640 0.743 0.812 0.713 1.452 1.455 1.425 1155.107 1017.494 526.316
20 2 3 0.620 0.720 0.834 0.737 1.454 1.457 1.429 1092.244 964.816 500.000
21 2 3 0.600 0.698 0.855 0.760 1.455 1.458 1.432 1031.991 914.227 476.190
22 2 3 0.580 0.675 0.876 0.784 1.456 1.459 1.435 974.234 865.643 454.545
23 1 2 0.405 0.560 1.047 0.897 1.452 1.457 1.438 1013.965 918.883 434.783
24 1 2 0.390 0.540 1.064 0.918 1.454 1.458 1.440 952.491 865.861 416.667
25 1 2 0.375 0.520 1.080 0.939 1.455 1.459 1.442 893.825 815.104 400.000
26 1 2 0.360 0.500 1.096 0.960 1.456 1.460 1.444 837.877 766.560 384.615
27 1 2 0.345 0.480 1.112 0.981 1.457 1.461 1.446 784.571 720.184 370.370
28 - 1 - 0.330 - 1.128 - 1.458 1.448 - 733.841 357.143
29 - 1 - 0.315 - 1.144 - 1.459 1.450 - 685.632 344.828
30 - 1 - 0.300 - 1.160 - 1.460 1.452 - 639.895 333.333
31 - 1 - 0.285 - 1.176 - 1.461 1.453 - 596.587 322.581
32 - 1 - 0.270 - 1.192 - 1.462 1.455 - 555.672 312.500
33 - 1 - 0.255 - 1.207 - 1.462 1.456 - 517.117 303.030
34 - 0 - 0.000 - 1.457 - 1.457 1.457 - 294.118 294.118
+∞ - 0 - 0 - 1.5 - 1.5 1.5 - 0 0
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